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Abstract 
 
It is important to note that market abuse is outlawed both at a federal and state level in the United States of America (the US). 
In relation to this, it is worth noting that the state prohibition on market abuse has relatively and immensely contributed to the 
combating of market abuse activities in the US capital and financial markets to date. Consequently, it is on this basis that this 
article provides a brief overview analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition, firstly in California state. 
Secondly, a similar analysis will be done focusing on Delaware state. Lastly, the enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
Washington state will be undertaken. The aforementioned states are selected not only because of their unique and relatively 
consistent anti-market abuse enforcement approaches but also because of the potential enforcement lessons that could be 
adopted from such approaches, especially in South Africa. Thereafter and where appropriate, relevant provisions and cases 
from the selected US states will be contrasted with similar provisions and cases in South Africa in order to identify and 
recommend, where necessary, possible anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that could be incorporated in the South 
African anti-market abuse regulatory and enforcement framework. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It is important to note that market abuse1 is outlawed both at a federal and state level in the United States of America (the 
US).2 In relation to this, it is worth noting that the state prohibition on market abuse has relatively and immensely 
contributed to the combating of market abuse activities in the US capital and financial markets to date. Consequently, it is 
on this basis that this article provides a brief overview analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition, firstly 
in California state. Secondly, a similar analysis will be done focusing on Delaware state. Lastly, the enforcement of the 
market abuse ban in Washington state will be undertaken. The aforementioned states are selected not only because of 
their unique and relatively consistent anti-market abuse enforcement approaches,3 but also because of the potential 
enforcement lessons that could be adopted from such approaches, especially in South Africa.4 Thereafter and where 
                                                                            
* Influenced in part, by Chitimira A Comparative Analysis of the Enforcement of Market Abuse Provisions (LLD Thesis 2012 NMMU) 188-210. In this regard, 
I wish to thank Professor Lawack.  
1 This term refers to both insider trading and market manipulation in this article.  
2 Steinberg “Insider Trading Regulation–A Comparative Perspective” 2003 The International Lawyer 153 169-171.  
3 Crandall “State Securities Regulation and the Internet” 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 23 24-31; Langevoort “Federalism in Corporate/Securities Law: 
Reflections on Delaware, California, and State Regulation of Insider Trading” 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 879 880-892. For further related 
comparative analysis, see Bhattacharya & Daouk “The World Price of Insider Trading” 2002 Journal of Finance 75 75-108; Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of 
Insider Trading in Australia (2005) 159-168 for related comparative analysis in other countries & Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market 
Abuse: A legal and Economic Analysis (2005) 75-502.  
4 Chitimira A Comparative Analysis of the Enforcement of Market Abuse Provisions (2012) 188-210. Also see Botha “Control of Insider Trading in South 
Africa: A Comparative Analysis” 1991 SA Merc LJ 1 1-18; Botha “Increased Maximum Fine for Insider Trading: A Realistic and Effective Deterrent?” 1990 
SALJ 504-508; Chitimira The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Roadmap for an Effective, Competitive and Adequate Regulatory Statutory 
Framework (2008) LLM dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 41–72. See related comments by Van Deventer “Anti-Market Abuse Legislation in South Africa” 
(10-06-2008) 1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2013) & see further Myburgh & Davis “The Impact of South 
Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial Services Board” (25-03-2004) 8-33 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2013). See further Osode “The new South African Insider Trading Act: Sound law reform or legislative overkill?” 2000 Journal of African 
Law 239 239; Bhana “Take-Over Announcements and Insider Trading Activity on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” 1987 South African Journal of 
Business Management 198-208; Jooste “A critique of the insider trading provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” 2006 SALJ 437 441–460; Van 
Deventer “New watchdog for insider trading” 1999 FSB Bulletin 2 3. Also read the recently repealed Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, hereinafter referred 
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appropriate, relevant provisions and cases from the selected US states will be contrasted with similar provisions and 
cases in South Africa in order to identify and recommend, where necessary, possible anti-market abuse enforcement 
approaches that could be incorporated in the South African anti-market abuse regulatory and enforcement framework. 
 
2. Overview of the State Prohibition on Market Abuse 
 
2.1 Prohibition on Insider Trading in California 
 
Insider trading is statutorily prohibited under the California Corporations Code.5 Put differently, an issuer or any other 
person who is an officer, director or controlling person of such issuer or any person who knowingly has access directly or 
indirectly, to material non-public information that relates to any securities by virtue of his relationship with the issuer is 
prohibited from dealing in such securities in order to prevent insider trading. 6  Notably, there is a requirement of 
knowledge on the part of the accused person that the material non-public information he obtained will significantly affect 
the market price of the securities in question before incurring any insider trading liability.7 Moreover, such liability can only 
be imposed upon the accused if he fails to prove that the affected person was aware of the non-public information in 
question; or that the affected person would have purchased or sold the securities in question at the same price even if the 
material non-public information was made public.8  
California’s insider trading prohibition is limited only to officers, directors, controlling shareholders of an issuer 
(primary insiders) and/or any other person who obtains non-public material information by virtue of his relationship with 
primary insiders.9 Consequently, violations by other persons who fortuitously obtain non-public material information not 
on the basis of their relationship with any of the primary insiders are not expressly covered under California’s insider 
trading prohibition.10 Nonetheless, California’s insider trading prohibition has an extra-territorial application that covers 
any violations that are perpetrated in California by primary insiders of a corporation incorporated in another state or 
country (foreign corporations).11 In relation to this, accessorial liability can also be imposed on individuals who tip, induce 
or assist others to contravene any California’s insider trading provisions.12 
 
2.2 Prohibition on Market Manipulation in California  
 
Disclosure-based market manipulation, trade-based market manipulation, Internet-based market manipulation and 
commodity-based market manipulation practices are statutorily prohibited under the California Corporations Code. Trade-
based market manipulation practices include:  
(a) the use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the price of a security;13  
(b) effecting a transaction in a security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership;  
(c) entering orders for the sale or purchase of any security with the knowledge that similar orders have been 
entered at the same price and/or at the same time for that security by the same or different persons; and  
(d) effecting alone, or with other persons, a series of transactions in any security to create actual or apparent 
active trading in such security in order to raise or depress the price of that security for the purposes of inducing 
its sale or purchase by others.14  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
to as the Securities Services Act, in conjunction with the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Act, which came 
into effect on 03 June 2013 to trace the anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that are employed in South Africa.  
5 Also known as the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (California Statutes 1968, Chapter 88), hereinafter referred to as the California Corporations Code. 
See ss 25402 & 25502.5 read with s 25502.  
6 S 25402 California Corporations Code. 
7 S 25402 read with ss 25110; 25210 & 25230 (which prohibits investment advisors and broker-dealers from dealing in securities without licensure or 
exemption) of the California Corporations Code.  
8 S 25402 read with ss 25502.5 & 25502 of the California Corporations Code. Also see generally related remarks by Bingham McCutchen Securities 
Litigation Group “California’s Unique Treble Damages Insider Trading Law Applied to Corporations Incorporated Outside of California” 2006 Securities 
Litigation Alert 1-3 <http://www.bingham.com.01.2006/03> (accessed 26-10-2013).  
9 S 25402 of the California Corporations Code. Also see Langevoort 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 886.  
10 S 25402 of the California Corporations Code. 
11 Friese v Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal Rptr 3d 558 (Cal Ct App) 563-568, where it was held that although the internal affairs doctrine (as codified under s 
2116) stipulates that only the state of incorporation may adjudicate on insider trading and/or any other violations, the defendants’ breach of s 25502.5 of the 
California Corporations Code did not merely give rise to fiduciary duties violations but to insider trading and as such it was not rigidly subject to the internal 
affairs doctrine.  
12 S 25403 of the California Corporations Code. 
13 S 25541 of the California Corporations Code. 
14 S 25400(a) & (b) of the California Corporations Code. 
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Disclosure-based market manipulation practices include the dissemination of false or misleading material 
information pertaining to the sale or purchase of a security by a broker-dealer or any other person so that the price of 
such security will or is likely to rise or fall (raising or depressing its market price) for the purposes of inducing others to 
purchase or sell that security.15 In line with this, disclosure-based market manipulation practices also include the oral or 
written communication of false or misleading statements that relate to the sale or purchase of securities by any 
offenders.16 Liability for both disclosure-based market manipulation and trade-based market manipulation requires proof 
on the part of the prosecution that the offenders wilfully participated, directly or indirectly in the effecting of a manipulative 
transaction or in the making or dissemination of a false and misleading statement of a material fact relating to any 
security; or that they omitted to state such material fact in order to make the statement, in light of the circumstances it 
was made, not misleading.17  
Commodity-based market manipulation practices that are outlawed include:  
(a) wilful engagement by any person, in the making of a false report; 
(b) entering any false record or untrue statement of a material fact and/or omitting to make the material fact in 
order to make any statement relating to a commodity, commodity contract or option false and misleading.18   
Additionally, engaging in any transaction, act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as 
fraud or deceit upon commodities investors and the employing of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate 
the sale or purchase of any commodity is prohibited.19  
Internet-based market manipulation as well as franchise-related touting and manipulative practices are statutorily 
prohibited in California.20 For example, the intentional making of any untrue statement of a material fact relating to the 
sale or purchase of a franchise is a felony under the California Corporations Code.21 Moreover, the California Department 
of Corporations established the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team to oversee the prohibition of Internet-based 
market manipulation by inter alia requiring all persons to obtain a permit before issuing any securities.22 
 
2.3 Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in California 
 
An issuer or any person who wilfully engages in insider trading or market manipulation and fails to rely on the defences 
as earlier discussed23 will be liable for a fine not more than $10 million upon conviction or be imprisoned in a state prison 
(or pursuant to the California Penal Code)24 for a period between two and five years, or be liable for both the fine and 
imprisonment.25 Moreover, an issuer as defined in the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
200226 who commits insider trading, market manipulation or who violates any rule or order that prohibits market abuse will 
be criminally liable for a fine not more than $25 million upon conviction, or imprisonment in a state prison, or in terms of 
the California Penal Code, 27  for a period between two and five years and/or be liable for both such fine and 
imprisonment.28 The California Corporations Code specifically imposes a fine not exceeding $10 million, or imprisonment 
in a state prison for a period between two and five years, or both such fine and imprisonment upon any person who 
wilfully employs, directly or indirectly, a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, purchase or sale of 
securities.29 Similarly, an issuer as defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act30 who wilfully employs, directly or indirectly, a 
                                                                            
15 S 25400(d) read with ss 25400(c) & (e) & 25401 of the California Corporations Code. 
16 Ss 25400 & 25401 read with s 25404 of the California Corporations Code. 
17 Ss 25400; 25401; 25541 read with ss 25404; 25500 & 25501 of the California Corporations Code. 
18 S 29536(b) of the California Commodity Law of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the California Corporations Code).  
19 S 29536(a); (c) & (d) of the California Corporations Code read with s 29520; 29535 & 29538 of the same Code, which prohibits any person from 
purchasing or selling commodities without licensure or exemption and/or from concealing evidence or making untrue statements to the California 
Department of Corporations.  
20 Ss 31200 to 31204 of the California Corporations Code. 
21 Ss 31200 to 31204 read with ss 31210; 31211 & 31220 of the California Corporations Code. 
22 Ss 25111 to 25113; 25140(c) read with ss 25400 & 25401 of the California Corporations Code. Also see California Department of Corporations “Internet 
Investments Ordered to Stop Selling” Press Release 98-11 (10-06-1998) <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrel/nr9811.htm> (accessed 27-10-2013); California 
Department of Corporations “Department of Corporations Files Internet Market Manipulation Actions” Press Release 00-11 (20-06-2000) 
<http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrel/nr0011.htm> (accessed 27-10-2013) & Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 23-31.  
23 See paragraph 2.1 above. 
24 S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code. 
25 S 25540(b) of the California Corporations Code. 
26 Public Law 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (as codified in scattered sections of 15; 28 USC), hereinafter referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its relevant 
provisions will be referred to only where necessary. See s 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations (2005) 23.  
27 S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code. 
28 S 25540(c) read with s 25540(a) of the California Corporations Code. 
29 S 25541(a) of the California Corporations Code. 
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device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, purchase or sale of a security will be liable for a fine not 
exceeding $25 million, or imprisonment in a state prison for a period between two and five years, or both such fine and 
imprisonment.31  
Persons who violate the insider trading provisions will be directly liable to the person who sold or purchased the 
affected security for the damages equal to the difference between the price at which such security was sold or purchased 
and the market value which such security would have acquired at the time of the purchase or sale if the information 
known to the defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that time.32 This civil liability also includes interest at a 
legal rate accruing to the plaintiff (affected person) provided that a reasonable period of time has lapsed for the market to 
absorb the publicly disclosed material information, or that the defendant failed to rely on any available defences.33 In 
addition, any person other than the issuer who commits insider trading will be liable to the issuer or anyone acting 
derivatively on behalf of the issuer for civil damages of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of 
the insider trading in question.34   
Any person (defendant) who commits market manipulation will be liable for compensatory damages to any other 
person (plaintiff) who purchased or sold securities at an affected or manipulated price as a result of such defendant’s illicit 
act or transaction.35 This civil liability seems not to be limited to the plaintiff who initially bought or sold the securities that 
were affected by the defendant’s market manipulation.36 In the same vein, any person who wilfully disseminates false or 
misleading statements which relate to any securities will be liable to the affected person, for rescission or compensatory 
damages.37 It is not required that the plaintiff should have actually relied on the false or misleading statements in question 
before the defendant is held liable for such recessionary or compensatory damages plus interest at a legal rate.38 
Furthermore, there is secondary civil liability for controlling persons, aiders and abettors who participated in disclosure-
based market manipulation.39     
The California Corporations Code further imposes separate criminal penalties on any person who commits 
commodities-based market manipulation offences.40 Such a person will be liable for a fine not more than $250 000 or 
imprisonment in a state prison, or pursuant to the California Penal Code for a period between two and five years or for 
both such fine and imprisonment.41 With regard to civil liability, there are no private rights of action for the affected 
persons to recover their damages directly from those who commit commodities-based market manipulation offences.42 
Nevertheless, any person who aids or assists another person to contravene any commodities-based market manipulation 
provisions will be jointly and severally liable with any such person for damages.43 
Any person who wilfully engages in franchise-related touting and market manipulation will be liable to a fine not 
exceeding $100 000 or imprisonment in a state prison for a period not exceeding one year, or imprisonment pursuant to 
the California Penal Code,44 or both such fine and imprisonment.45 Such a person will also be liable to the franchisee, 
franchisor or any other affected person for compensatory damages.46 A controlling person or every partner in a company 
who aids or abets another person to commit franchise-related touting and market manipulation offences will be jointly and 
severally liable with such person for actual damages suffered by the affected person and/or a temporary and permanent 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
30 S 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
31 Ss 25541(b); 25542 of the California Corporations Code read with s 1170(h) of the California Penal Code. 
32 S 25502 of the California Corporations Code. 
33 S 25502 of the California Corporations Code. It is important to note that this provision gives private rights of action to the affected persons in order for 
them to recover their insider trading damages directly from offenders.  
34 S 25502.5 of the California Corporations Code. These treble insider trading damages are determined by calculating the difference between the price at 
which the security was purchased or sold and the market value that it would have gained at the time of the sale or purchase if the non public information 
known to the defendant or the offender was publicly disseminated; Friese v Superior Court 563-568.  
35 Ss 25500; 28900 & 28901 of the California Corporations Code. 
36 On the other hand, market manipulation offenders are apparently exempted from any liability that could arise from routine statements such as press 
releases and quarterly reports that are not intended to induce others to sale or purchase any securities, see s 25500 read with s 25400 of the California 
Corporations Code.  
37 S 25501 read with s 25501.5 of the California Corporations Code.  
38 S 25501 read with s 25501.5 of the California Corporations Code.  
39 S 25501 read with ss 25504 & 25504.1 of the California Corporations Code.  
40 S 29550 of the California Corporations Code. 
41 S 29550(b) & (c); read with s 29551 of the California Corporations Code, which stipulates that the California State may also bring criminal charges against 
the offenders under any other statute. Also see s 1170(h) of the California Penal Code.  
42 S 29555 of the California Corporations Code. 
43 S 29552 read with ss 29553 & 29554 of the California Corporations Code. 
44 S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code.  
45 Ss 31410; 31411 read with s 31412 of the California Corporations Code. 
46 S 31300 read with 31301 of the California Corporations Code. 
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injunctive relief.47  
The California Department of Corporations can also impose administrative penalties such as public censure, 
suspension, revocation of licenses, civil injunctions and administrative orders against any person who engages in 
fraudulent and manipulative Internet-based offering of investments and financial services.48 Additionally, the California 
Department of Corporations can impose remedies such as rescission, restitution, civil penalties and administrative 
penalties against any person who commits Internet-based market manipulation offences. 49  Lastly, the California 
Department of Corporations can issue investigation orders against Internet-based market manipulation offenders and/or 
refer any such related criminal matters to the relevant courts for further investigation or prosecution.50  
 
2.4 Analysis and Evaluation of the California Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework 
 
The California Department of Corporations, the Commissioner of Corporations and the relevant courts are responsible for 
the enforcement of market abuse provisions in California.51  As earlier stated,52 California employs criminal, civil and 
administrative sanctions to combat market abuse activities.53 These sanctions are enforced by the California Department 
of Corporations through the Commissioner of Corporations and the courts. In relation to this, it is must be noted that there 
is no specific regulatory body established to oversee the enforcement of market abuse laws in California. Consequently, 
the Commissioner of Corporations has a variety of powers which include:  
(a) imposing fees and penalties;  
(b) cease and desist orders;  
(c) revocation orders;  
(d) restitution orders;  
(e) civil injunction orders;  
(f) investigation orders;  
(g) public censure against the offenders; and 
(h) issuing permits to all persons who seek to offer or sell investments, commodities or securities in California.54  
The Commissioner of Corporations has further powers to make, amend or rescind any rules and/or orders for the 
purposes of effectively enforcing the securities and market abuse provisions.55 Similarly, the Financial Services Board 
(the FSB) is empowered to make market abuse rules in South Africa.56 Notwithstanding the fact that the there is no 
specific regulatory body that policies the enforcement of market abuse laws in California, it is submitted that the 
Commissioner of Corporations has, from time to time, consistently exercised his/her powers to curb market abuse 
activities.57  
With regard to Internet-based market manipulation, the California Department of Corporations relies on the Internet 
Compliance and Enforcement Team to investigate and prosecute any activities that amount to unlicensed securities, 
franchises or commodities offerings, and fraud and market manipulation.58 The Internet Compliance and Enforcement 
Team also ensures that there is extensive investigation and surveillance of Internet-based market manipulation. 59 
Accordingly, if any violation is detected, it will be reported to the Commissioner of Corporations who then determines 
whether it was fair and justifiable.60 Put differently, when the Commissioner of Corporations receives some leads from the 
Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team’s surveillance, junk mail and public complaints and referrals from other 
enforcement bodies, he may impose damages or other applicable remedies against the offenders.61 In contrast to this, 
                                                                            
47 Ss 31302 & 31302.5 of the California Corporations Code. 
48 Ss 25530 to 25534 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 30 & related remarks by the California 
Department of Corporations “Fighting Internet ‘Cyber Investment Fraud’” <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/cyber.htm> (accessed 28-10-2013).  
49 S 25535 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 30. 
50 S 25533 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 30. 
51 Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 28-30. 
52 See paragraph 2.3 read with paragraphs 2.1; 2.2. 
53 This also the position in South Africa. See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82 of the Financial Markets Act.  
54 Ss 25111 to 25113 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 28-30.  
55 Ss 31502 & 31503 of the California Corporations Code. 
56 S 84(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Act. 
57 Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 29-30. 
58  Ss 25000 to 31516 of the California Corporations Code; also see Mariano “Stock Fraud Spurs Regulators to Look Online” (21-06-2000) 
<http://news.cnet.com/news/01-1005-200-2126256.html> (accessed 29-10-2013).  
59 Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 24. 
60 S 25140(c) of the California Corporations Code; Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 24. 
61 S 25535 of the California Corporations Code; also see paragraph 2.3 above. This has enabled California to curb Internet-based market manipulation 
successfully since 1998 to date, see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 26-31.  
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there is no specific regulatory body that prohibits and investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South 
Africa.62 
The district courts have to date enabled the California Department of Corporations to enforce the market abuse 
prohibition consistently in California. For example, the California Department of Corporations has successfully filed for a 
number of civil remedies such as the disgorgement of profits, damages and civil injunctions in the courts.63   
Likewise, South Africa also provides for civil,64 criminal65 and administrative66 penalties for insider trading in terms 
of the Financial Markets Act. With regard to criminal penalties, the South African legislature has rigidly provided for a 
fixed maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both.67 Although prima facie 
these penalties seem to be quite significant, it is submitted that Cassim68 correctly argues that the current available 
market abuse penalties might not be high enough for deterrence purposes. For example, some unscrupulous persons 
and/or companies may take any fine for market abuse offences just like another cost of doing business. Furthermore, no 
distinction has been made in relation to the penalties imposed on natural and juristic persons to increase deterrence.69 
Moreover, in South Africa, civil and administrative penalties and remedies are mainly enforced by the FSB70 and the 
Enforcement Committee (the EC)71 respectively. However, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide civil 
penalties and remedies for market manipulation offences.72 This flaw could potentially weaken South Africa’s anti-market 
abuse regime,73 compared to similar foreign legislation in countries like the US. 
As briefly highlighted above, one can conclude that California has managed to develop a relatively consistent anti-
market abuse enforcement framework that discourages a number of market abuse practices (including franchise-related, 
capital markets related as well as Internet-related market abuse violations).  
 
2.5 Prohibition on Insider Trading in Delaware 
 
Unlike the position in California,74 insider trading is mainly outlawed as a breach of fiduciary duties by directors, officers or 
other employees (primary insiders) of an issuer who sell or purchase the issuer’s securities or commodities on the basis 
of non-public inside information.75 Apparently, this fiduciary-related insider trading liability may be imposed upon any 
offenders who violate Delaware’s securities and market abuse laws even if the issuer or any other affected persons did 
                                                                            
62 Internet-based market abuse practices are not expressly prohibited under the Financial Markets Act, see ss 78; 80; 81 & 82. Moreover, Internet-based 
market abuse practices are also not expressly outlawed in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008.  
63 Friese v Superior Court 561, where the court held that the civil derivative cause of action for disgorgement of insider trading profits was also applicable to 
companies that were not incorporated in California; also see Langevoort 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 886-887; Medifast v Minkow (2011) 
10 CV 382 (JLS BGS), where the court held that defendants were not liable for civil remedies for their alleged market manipulation; Louisiana Pacific 
Corporation v Money Market 1Institutional Investment Dealer and others (2011) 09-CV-03529 (JSW), where market manipulation damages were granted 
against the defendants; Williams v Gaylord (1902) 186 US 157, where it was inter alia held that a corporation that issues securities in any State is protected 
from possible market abuse liability that may arise from another State under the internal affairs doctrine; Clothesrigger Inc v G T E Corporation (1987) 191 
Cal App 3d 605, where it was held that California’s market abuse laws may be enforced whenever necessary to prevent fraud and other deceptive or 
manipulative practices; Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc v Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal 1036, the court held that California’s securities and market abuse 
laws should be consistently enforced to promote financial markets that are fair and free from fraud and market abuse practices; Desai, Lamb, Long and 
Christopher Long v Deutsche Bank Securities Limited, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc and others (2009) 08-55081 US App Lexis 16704 (US App 9th Cir), the 
court held inter alia that the defendants were not liable for stock price manipulation because the appellants failed to establish a motion for class certification 
in terms of Rule 23(b)(3) of the federal rules.  
64 S 82.  
65 S 109(a).  
66 S 99. 
67 S 109 (a).  
68 Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 2)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 177 191-195.  
69 S 109(a) of the Financial Markets Act.  
70 S 84 of the Financial Markets Act.  
71 S 99 of the Financial Markets Act.  
72 Ss 80 & 81; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192. This suggests that persons who fall victim to market manipulation practices are left to find their own 
civil remedies. Also see Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 1)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 33 36.  
73 Notably, there is no specific statutory civil remedy provision for market manipulation violations as outlawed under ss 80 & 81of the Financial Markets Act.  
74 See paragraph 2.1 above. 
75 See generally s 144 read with ss 160 to 162; 122(17); 271 & 174 under Title 8 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (hereinafter referred to as the 
Delaware General Corporation Law); s 73-202 read with ss 73-203 & 73-204 in Title 6 of the Delaware Code, under Chapter 73 of the Delaware Securities 
Act as amended (hereinafter referred to as Delaware Securities Act); also see Langevoort 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 881 & Brophy v 
Cities Service Co (1949) 70 A2d 5 (Del Ch), where it was inter alia held that the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty was tantamount to insider 
trading.  
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not suffer actual damages as result of the offender’s alleged insider trading.76 Likewise, a corporation may not repurchase 
its own shares if such repurchase will affect its payment of debts or cause capital impairment.77  
In addition, any sale or purchase of securities on the basis of non-public material information by a beneficial owner, 
director or officer of an insurer is also treated as insider trading.78 This prohibition on insurance-related insider trading 
allows the insurer to recover any damages suffered within a period of less than six months unless the sale or purchase of 
the affected securities was done in good faith.79 Intention on the part of the offenders is not required for the purposes 
incurring insurance-related insider trading liability. 80  On the other hand, in South Africa, there is no provision that 
specifically prohibits insurance-related insider trading in the Financial Markets Act.81 
 
2.6 Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Delaware 
 
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, sale or purchase of a security 
will be liable for market manipulation.82 In addition, any person who make or omits to make a statement of a material fact 
in order to deceive or mislead others to purchase or sale a security will be liable for fraud and/or market manipulation.83 In 
the same light, any persons who are not registered with the Securities Commissioner are prohibited from offering to sell 
or purchase any securities.84 Moreover, misleading filings and unlawful purchase or sale of securities by broker-dealers, 
shareholders or any other person are prohibited.85 This was probably targeted at preventing securities or stock price 
market manipulation by professional persons like broker-dealers, investment advisors, shareholders and other relevant 
stakeholders. 
Unlike the position in California,86 under the Delaware courts, a breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure by directors 
who issue misstated financial statements or misleading public statements to defraud, induce or manipulate others to 
purchase or sell any securities may give rise to monetary damages against such directors.87  
Although it appears that there is no statutory provision that expressly prohibits commodities-based market 
manipulation in Delaware, a number of deceptive or unfair commerce, trade and insurance practices are outlawed to inter 
alia combat market abuse activities.88 Delaware also prohibits racketeering and other forms of organised crime in order to 
discourage all persons from engaging in market abuse activities.89 In contrast to this, there is no provision that specifically 
prohibits racketeering and/or commerce and trade-related market abuse activities in South Africa, especially under the 
Financial Markets Act.90 
 
2.7 Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Delaware  
 
Any person who engages in fraudulent market manipulation which results in investors losing $50 000 or more will be 
                                                                            
76 Brophy v Cities Service Co 5; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP (2010) CA No 436 (Del SC) & Guth v Loft Inc (1939) 5A2d 503 (Del) 510, where 
it was held that an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence towards his employer who nonetheless abuses non-public material information 
relating to the employer’s securities to gain profit will be liable for insider trading regardless of whether the employer suffered actual loss.  
77 In other words, a corporation may not repurchase its own shares while in possession of non public material information that relates to any securities to 
prevent insider trading, see s 160 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.  
78 Ss 5104 & 5105 in Title 18, under Chapter 51of the Delaware Insurance Code (hereinafter referred to as the Insurance Code).  
79 S 5104 (a) of the Insurance Code.  
80 S 5104 (a) read with 5104(b) & (c) of the Insurance Code.  
81 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82 & other relevant provisions under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Act. Moreover, in South Africa, 
insurance-related insider trading is not expressly prohibited under both the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 as amended and the Short-Term Insurance 
Act 53 of 1998 as amended.  
82 This indicates that trade-based market manipulation practices are also prohibited in Delaware, see s 73-201(1) of the Delaware Securities Act.  
83 S 73-201(2) & (3) of the Delaware Securities Act.  
84 S 73-202 read with ss 73-203 & 73-204 of the Delaware Securities Act.  
85 Ss 73-209; 73-301of the Delaware Securities Act & s 610 read with ss 612 & 616 in Title 8 (Delaware General Corporation Law) under Chapter 6, which is 
also known as the Delaware Professional Service Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Professional Service Corporations Act).  
86 See paragraph 2.2 above. 
87 See generally s 220(d) read with s 220(b) & (c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which gives shareholders the right to seek and/or inspect 
financial statements in order to inter alia prevent fraud and market manipulation; also see Malone v Brincat (1998) CA No 15510 WL 919123 (Del Supr. Ct); 
Malone v Brincat (1998) 722 A2d 5 (Del) where it was held that the director or defendant who filed or disseminated false information in a financial statement 
could be held liable for a breach of general fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or good faith and not for common law prohibited fraudulent and market abuse 
activities & Seinfield v Verizon Communications Inc (2006) 909 A2d 717 (Del), the court held that shareholders are entitled to inspect or seek relevant 
information from a corporation to detect and prevent fraud and disclosure-based market manipulation.  
88 Ss 2303 & 2304(1) to (12) in Title 18, under Chapter 23 of the Insurance Code; also see s 2532(a) to (c) in Title 6, under Chapter 25 of the Delaware 
Code which is also known as the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).  
89 S 1503 in Title 11, under Chapter 15 of the Delaware Criminal Code. 
90 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82.  
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liable per violation to a fine not exceeding $200 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than five 
years at level V incarceration, or both such fine and imprisonment.91 In the same way any person who engages in fraud 
or market manipulation which results in investors losing $10 000 or more but less than $50 000, will be liable per violation 
for a fine not more than $100 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than three years at level V 
incarceration, or both such fine and imprisonment.92 Furthermore, any person who wilfully violates any related fraud or 
securities provisions of the Delaware Securities Act will be liable for a fine of not more than $100 000, or imprisonment for 
a period no more than two years, or both such fine and imprisonment.93 The Securities Commissioner may impose 
injunctions, administrative remedies and stop orders to prohibit market abuse violations by the offenders by suspending 
or revoking the purchase or sale of any affected security.94  
A broker-dealer, broker-dealer agent, issuer agent, investment advisor, investment advisor’s representative or any 
other person who offers, sells or purchases securities by means of an untrue statement or any other market manipulation 
practices will be liable for civil compensatory damages.95 Moreover, the courts may impose upon the insider trading 
offenders, orders for damages, disgorgement of illicit profits and other applicable remedies.96 The courts may further 
impose a fine of up to $5 million or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 years upon the insider trading offenders.97  
With regard to prohibited manipulative trade practices, the offenders may be ordered by the relevant courts through 
an injunction to pay legal costs, compensatory damages or to disgorge any profits gained to the affected persons.98 
Moreover, any persons who engage in insurance related market abuse activities will be ordered by the courts to disgorge 
any profits they gained at the expense of the insurers.99 The Commissioner of Insurance may also issue cease and desist 
orders and penalty orders against any person who commits insurance-related market abuse offences.100 
 
2.8 Analysis and Evaluation of the Delaware Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
Like California,101 Delaware does not have a specific regulatory body that enforces its market abuse laws. Nonetheless, 
Delaware has established a consistent system of reliance on judicial law standards, as well as well-developed common 
law and private enforcement measures to combat market abuse activities.102 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme 
Court, the Delaware Chancery Court, the Delaware General Assembly, the Delaware Corporate Law Council, the 
Delaware Division of Securities and the Delaware Division Corporations bear the responsibility of enforcing the 
Delaware’s securities and market abuse laws.103  
As stated earlier,104 Delaware generally treats any securities dealing that is based on non-public inside information 
by primary insiders as a breach of fiduciary duties that also amounts to insider trading. Thus, although Delaware does not 
have a statutory provision that expressly prohibits insider trading, it has to date successfully relied on common law 
principles on fiduciary duties to combat insider trading.105 This success has prompted other commentators to conclude 
                                                                            
91 S 73-604(a) of the Delaware Securities Act.  
92 S 73-604(b) of the Delaware Securities Act.  
93 S 73-604(c) of the Delaware Securities Act. The Supreme Court may also order the offenders to restitute any profits they obtained from the affected 
investors, see s 73-604(d) & (e) of the Delaware Securities Act.  
94 S 73-206 read with ss 73-601 & 73-602 of the Delaware Securities Act. 
95 S 73-605(a) & (b) of the Delaware Securities Act. 
96 Brophy v Cities Service Co 5; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP 436, where the defendants were mandated to pay damages and to disgorge 
their insider trading profits to the affected persons (plaintiffs) even if such persons did not suffer actual damages.  
97 The United States Department of Justice District of Delaware “Newark Man Pleads Guilty to Insider Trading Charges” Press Release 25 March 2011, 
where Jeffery Temple of Newark DE was convicted of insider trading in March 2011 and was consequently liable for a fine not exceeding $5 million or 
imprisonment for a period of up to 20 years. 
98 S 2533(b) & (c) read with subsections (d) & (e) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  
99 S 5104 of the Insurance Code.  
100 S 2308 read with s 2311 of the Insurance Code.  
101 Paragraph 2.4 above. 
102 See related remarks by Bebchuk & Hamdani “Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History” 2006 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, 
Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 558 35-37 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2013).  
103 Roe “Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers” 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion 
Paper Series 638 8-12 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2013); Jones “Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and 
Securities Enforcement” 2005 Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 36 2 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/36> (accessed 04-11-2013) & Wilson 
“Climate Change: The Real Threat to Delaware Corporation Law, Why Delaware Must Keep A Watchful Eye on The Content of Political Change in the Air” 
2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 481 484-490.  
104 Paragraph 2.5 above. 
105 Brophy v Cities Service Co 5, the defendants were ordered to pay compensatory insider trading remedies to the plaintiffs regardless of whether such 
plaintiffs suffered actual damages; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP 436, where the plaintiffs (stockholders) were allowed to institute a derivative 
action against the defendants (corporate fiduciaries) for their alleged insider trading violations without proof of any actual damages suffered by such plaintiffs 
or their corporation & Guth v Loft Inc 503-510, the court held that any breach of fiduciary duties through insider trading was against public policy.  
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that Delaware was effectively combating insider trading and market manipulation because it cedes other areas of its laws 
that involve insider trading enforcement to the federal government.106 Unlike the position in Delaware, insider trading 
liability is not limited to instances where there is a breach of a fiduciary duty by primary insiders in South Africa.107 
On the other hand, Delaware’s fiduciary-related insider trading remedies were controversially applied in some few 
cases.108 Be that as it may, one fact which is certain is that Delaware relies heavily on its courts’ judicial law standards 
and private enforcement to monitor and enforce its insider trading prohibition.109 
In addition to the Delaware specialised corporate bar, courts and judicial law standards,110 the Delaware Division 
Corporations’ Securities Commissioner has powers to investigate, subpoena any suspects and issue stop orders, 
injunctions and other administrative remedies against any persons who commit insider trading or market manipulation.111 
Likewise, the Commissioner of Insurance may issue investigation orders, cease and desist orders, penalty orders and 
judicial review orders against any market abuse offenders.112  This has enabled Delaware Division Corporations to 
effectively complement the relevant courts in tackling and addressing market abuse challenges.113 Unlike California,114 
Delaware further has a specialised commercial court and whistle-blower immunity provisions to encourage employees or 
any person to report any securities and market abuse violations without fear of reprisals from their employers or other 
offenders.115 In relation to this, South Africa relies mainly on the FSB rather than judicial law standards to enforce its 
market abuse prohibition. Moreover, South Africa’s market abuse laws do not have a specific whistle-blower immunity 
provision to encourage all persons to report market abuse violations to the FSB or other relevant authorities without any 
fear of victimisation.116 Furthermore, as earlier stated,117 the criminal penalties and/or available remedies for market 
abuse offences are still relatively few and little for deterrence purposes. 
Given the above analysis, one can conclude that Delaware has to date managed to flexibly and consistently 
develop effective and robust common law as well as judicial law standards to increase the private enforcement of its 
market abuse prohibition. Perhaps this explains why some commentators allude to the fact that Delaware is the 
“corporate haven” of the US.118 
                                                                            
106 Hamermesh “How We Make Law in Delaware and What to Expect from Us in the Future” 2007 Journal of Business & Technology Law 409 413-414.  
107 See ss 78 & 82 of the Financial Markets Act. 
108 In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation (2003) WL 21396449 (Del Ch); In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation (2004) 867 A2d 904 (Del Ch) 
934; In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation (2005) 872 A2d 960 (Del Ch), the court held that the fiduciaries (defendants) should have traded on the 
basis of non public inside information they possessed to the detriment of their corporation before any disgorgement of profits can be paid to the affected 
plaintiff. Nonetheless, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s derivative action for breach of fiduciary duties and/or insider trading; 
Guttman v Huang (2003) 823 A2d 492 (Del Ch) 499-507; In re American International Group Inc (2009) 965 A2d 763 (Del Ch) 813; Paddy Wood v Baum, 
Berndt, Brown & others (2007) CA 621 (Del Supr. Ct); Pfeiffer v Toll Brother Inc & others (2010) 989 A2d 683 (Del Ch), where the court inter alia held that 
the plaintiff must prove that he suffered actual harm as a result of the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty through insider trading. This ruling was later 
reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court citing its unduly restricted approach and the defendants were ordered to pay compensatory damages regardless 
of whether the plaintiff suffered actual loss through breach of fiduciary duties or insider trading & Milbank Corporate Governance Group “Delaware Supreme 
Court Rejects Narrow Reading of Brophy” (27-07-2011) Client Alert 1-4 <http://www.milbank.com.cl/al.pdf> (accessed 27-07-2013), apparently, this so-
called Brophy claim for insider trading damages is contingent upon the courts’ interpretation of the violation in question. Similarly, in Zapata Corporation v 
Maldonado (1981) 430 A2d 779 (Del Ch), it was held that affected persons will only recover their insider trading damages if prior investigations were 
objectively conducted and such objectivity is discretionally determined by the courts.  
109 Kahan & Rock “Symbiotic Federalism and The Structure of Corporate Law” 2005 Vanderbilt Law Review 1573 1604-1609 & 1620; Ott “Delaware Strikes 
Back: Newcastle Partners and The Fight for State Corporate Autonomy” 2007 Indiana Law Journal 159 171-173; Cary “Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware” 1974 Yale Law Journal 663 666-670; Roe 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business 
Discussion Paper Series 638 8-9 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2013); Bebchuk & Hamdani 2006 Harvard Law School John M 
Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 558 23-25 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2013) & Roe 
“Delaware’s Competition” 2003 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 432 3-4 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/432> (accessed 03-11-2013).  
110 Wilson 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 484; 486 & 490. 
111 Ss 73-206; 73-601; 73-602 & ss 73-401 to 73-404 of the Delaware Securities Act. 
112 Ss 2306 to 2309 & 2311 of the Insurance Code. 
113 Nacco Industries Inc v Applica (2009) 997 A2d 1 (Del Ch) 23, the court held that common law remedies were available against those who engage in 
Schedule 13D misstatements filing and other related disclosure-based market manipulation practices.  
114 Paragraph 2.4 above. 
115 See ss 1703 & 1704 in Title 19, under Chapter 17 of the Delaware Code, also known as the Delaware Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (hereinafter 
referred as the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act).  
116 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82 of the Financial Markets Act. Put differently, although s 159 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the 
Companies Act 2008; the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; s 9 of the South African constitution & the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 can be employed to protect shareholders, directors and other employees from occupational reprisals, there are no specific 
provisions in the Financial Markets Act that can be used to encourage and/or protect market abuse whistleblowers from such reprisals.  
117 See related remarks in paragraph 2.4 above. 
118  See Bebchuk & Hamdani 2006 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 558 1-5 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2013); Wilson 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 481-493; Ott 2007 Indiana Law Journal 
159-162; Ahdieh “From ‘Federalization’ to ‘Mixed Governance’ in Corporate Law: A Defence of Sarbanes-Oxley” 2005 Buff Law Review 721 736; Cary 1974 
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2.9 Prohibition on Insider Trading in Washington 
 
Unlike South Africa119 and California,120 Washington does not have a specific provision that directly and expressly 
prohibits insider trading. Nevertheless, insider trading is indirectly outlawed by discouraging directors, officers or 
employees from using non-public information filed with or obtained from the Department of Financial Institutions to deal in 
any security or commodity for personal gain.121 In contrast to the position in Delaware,122 liability for insider trading is 
apparently not restricted only to instances where there is a breach of fiduciary duties by primary insiders in Washington. 
Moreover, Washington does not clearly provide whether it is required that the offenders should have profited or benefited 
from their alleged insider trading before incurring any liability.123 The prohibition on insider trading is primarily restricted to 
directors, officers or other employees of a company.124 Despite this, Washington prohibits broker-dealers, investment 
advisors and any other person from offering or selling any security or commodity without being registered to prevent 
insider trading and other related illicit practices.125 
 
2.10 Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Washington  
 
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to manipulate the offer, sale or purchase of securities will be liable 
for fraud and/or market manipulation.126 Similarly, any person who received a consideration from another person is 
prohibited from employing a scheme, device, an act, practice or course of business and/or a dishonest practice for the 
purposes of influencing or advising other persons to purchase or sale any security.127 Accordingly, an investment advisor, 
broker-dealer or any other person who knowingly and manipulatively purchases or sells any security for his own account 
or for another person will be liable for market manipulation.128 This also indicates that trade-based market manipulation 
practices are statutorily outlawed in Washington. 
Likewise, disclosure-based market manipulation practices such as the making of false or misleading statements of 
a material fact or omitting to make a material fact in relation to any filed documents for the purposes of influencing the 
purchase or sale of any securities are prohibited.129 In relation to this, offering or selling unregistered securities by any 
person is expressly prohibited in Washington. 130  This prohibition is mainly aimed at discouraging all persons from 
deliberately engaging in unlawful fraudulent or market manipulation activities.  
Commodity-based market manipulation is also prohibited in Washington. For example, no person may directly or 
indirectly employ a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or influence others to purchase or sale any commodity contract 
or commodity option.131 Additionally, any person who engages in a transaction, act, practice, or course of business that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Yale Law Journal 664-702; Pritchard “London as Delaware?” 2009 University of Michigan Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Working 
Paper 09-008 1-2 <http://www.law.umich.edu /centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm> (accessed 04-11-2013) (seemingly, a John M Olin Center for Law & 
Economics is also established in the Harvard University Law School); Kahan & Rock 2005 Vanderbilt Law Review 1574 & 1620; Hamermesh 2007 Journal 
of Business & Technology Law 409-414; Jones 2005 Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 36 1-4 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/36> 
(accessed 04-11-2013); Roe 2003 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 432 2-44 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/432> (accessed 03-11-2013); Roe “Delaware’s Politics” 2005 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics 
& Business Discussion Paper Series 511 1-8 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/511> (accessed 03-11-2013); Thompson “Collaborative Corporate 
Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation” 2003 Wake Forest Law Review 961; Strine “The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate 
Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face” 2005 Del J.Corp.L 673 673-683; Fisch “The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the 
Competition for Corporate Charters” 2000 U.Cin.Law Review 1061 1064; Rock “Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?” 1997 
UCLA Law Review 1009 1024; Jones “Rethinking Corporate Federalism in Era of Corporate Reform” 2004 Journal of Corp. Law 625; Stevelman 
“Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law” 2009 Del J.Corp.L 57 66 & Gorris, Hamermesh & Strine “Delaware 
Corporate Law and The Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis” 2011 Law & Contemporary Problems 107 112-116.  
119 See ss 78 & 82 of the Financial Markets Act.  
120 Paragraph 2.1 above. 
121 See s 21.30.160 in Title 21, under Chapter 21.30 of the Revised Code of Washington Commodity Transactions 1986 c 14, s 46 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Commodity Transactions Act) & s 21.20.480 in Title 21, under Chapter 21.20 of the Revised Code of Washington 1951 c 5, s 2 as amended by 1959 c 
282, s 69 (hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act of Washington); also see s 21.20.140 of the Securities Act of Washington, which requires all persons 
to register with the Department of Financial Institutions before offering to sell any security or commodity.  
122 Paragraph 2.5 above. 
123 S 21.20.480 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.160 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
124 See s 21.20.480 read with s 21.20.140 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.160 of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
125 Ss 21.20.030; 21.20.035 & s 21.20.140 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.050 of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
126 S 21.20.010(1) & (3) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
127 S 21.20.020 of the Securities Act of Washington.  
128 S 21.20.020(2) read with ss 21.20.030 & 21.20.035 of the Securities Act of Washington.  
129 Ss 21.20.010(2) & 21.20.350 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
130 S 21.20.140 read with ss 21.20.040; 21.20.180 & 21.20.210 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
131 S 21.30.060(1) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
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will deceive others,132 or who makes a false or misleading report, record or statement of a material fact by omission or 
otherwise133 in order to induce others to purchase or sell any commodity or commodity option will be liable for market 
manipulation. Notably, any person who deliberately omits to state a material fact in relation to the purchase or sale of any 
commodity contract or commodity option will be liable for such omission and/or market manipulation.134 Moreover, no 
person may purchase or sell a commodity contract or commodity option, or engage in a trade, business or other act as a 
commodity merchant unless he is registered, licensed or exempted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.135 
This preventative measure is employed to combat commodity-based market manipulation. In contrast to the position in 
Washington state, South Africa’s market abuse laws do not have a specific provision that directly and expressly prohibits 
commodities-based market abuse practices.136  
 
2.11 Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Washington 
 
Any person who commits insider trading, market manipulation or other related securities violations will be liable upon 
conviction for a fine not exceeding $5 000, or imprisonment for a period of not more than ten years, or both such fine and 
imprisonment.137 Similarly, any person who alters, destroys, shreds or conceals a record or document and/or who 
knowingly attempts to make a false or misleading statement of a material fact will be liable for a class B felony or a fine 
not exceeding $500 000, or both such fine and class B felony.138 The Director of Financial Institutions may refer any 
criminal matters to the attorney general for further investigation and prosecution.139  
Furthermore, any person who commits fraud, market manipulation or other related securities violations will be 
liable to the person buying or selling the affected securities for civil damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest 
per annum.140 Every person who directly or indirectly controls another person and who commits or aids another person to 
commit market manipulation and other related securities violations will be jointly and severally liable with such person for 
civil damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest per annum.141  
The Director of Financial Institutions may also institute administrative actions such as restraining orders, 
administrative fines, injunctions, orders for judicial review and stop orders against the securities and market abuse 
offenders.142 Accordingly, any person who filed a false or misleading report or statement of a material fact in order to 
engage in market abuse activities or any other related securities violations will be liable to the affected persons for 
damages and reasonable legal costs.143 The Director of Financial Institutions may further suspend the sale or trading of 
the affected securities by or through a broker-dealer, until the false or misleading statements or reports are corrected.144  
Persons who perpetrate commodity-based market abuse and other related violations will be liable to a fine not 
exceeding $20 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more than ten years, or both such fine and 
imprisonment.145 However, no liability will be imputed upon any accused person if he proves that he had no knowledge of 
the violated rule or order or that he acted in good faith. 146  The prosecuting attorney may further impose criminal 
proceedings against any person who wilfully commits fraud, market manipulation or any other commodities-related 
violations. 147  The Director of Financial Institutions may, through the courts, issue compliance orders, declaratory 
judgments, cease and desist orders, summary orders, suspension orders, restitution orders, order for civil penalties, 
injunctions and other civil or administrative remedies against those who contravene the commodities provisions through 
fraud or market abuse practices.148 
 
                                                                            
132 S 21.30.060(3) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
133 S 21.30.060(2) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
134 S 21.30.070 read with ss 21.30.080 & 21.30.090 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
135 S 21.30.050 read with ss 21.30.020; 21.30.030 & 21.30.040 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
136 See ss 78; 80; 81 & 82 of the Financial Markets Act.  
137 S 21.20.400 (as amended by 2003 c 53) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
138 S 21.20.400 (as amended by 2003 c 288) of the Securities Act of Washington & s 9A.20.021(1)(b) of the Revised Code of Washington which deals with 
the punishment of the class B felony.  
139 S 21.20.410 read with s 21.20.420 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
140 S 21.20.430(1) & (2) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
141 S 21.20.430(3) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
142 S 21.20.280 read with ss 21.20.290; 21.20.390 & 21.20.395 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
143 S 21.20.745 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
144 S 21.20.750 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
145 S 21.30.140 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
146 S 21.30.140 read with s 21.30.150 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
147 S 21.30.360 read with s 21.30.370 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
148 Ss 21.30.110; 21.30.120; 21.30.130; 21.30.200 & 21.30.350 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
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2.12 Analysis and Evaluation of the Washington Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
The Director of Financial Institutions, courts (including the attorney general’s office) and the Department of Financial 
Institutions share the responsibility of enforcing the market abuse prohibition in Washington.149 As stated earlier,150 
Washington does not have a specific provision that prohibits insider trading. Accordingly, this could be creating some 
enforcement challenges for both the courts and the Department of Financial Institutions. For instance, it is extremely 
difficult to prove whether the accused person has knowingly committed any insider trading violations because the insider 
trading offence is not clearly defined.151  
A number of civil, criminal and administrative penalties may be employed by the Director of Financial Institutions 
against any market abuse offenders. For example, the Director of Financial Institutions may impose administrative 
penalties such as public censure, suspension or revocation of the license of any broker-dealer, salesperson, investment 
advisor’s representative, investment advisor or any other person who commits market abuse and other related securities 
violations.152 Remarkably, unlike the position in Washington, the FSB is not statutorily and expressly empowered to use 
public censure against the market abuse offenders in South Africa.153 The Director of Financial Institutions has further 
powers to investigate (publicly or privately) market abuse and other related violations.154 In line with this, the Director of 
Financial Institutions may subpoena witnesses in relation to any ongoing investigation which pertains to securities or 
market abuse violations.155 Unlike Delaware,156 Washington statutorily empowers its Director of Financial Institutions to 
publicly disseminate any information concerning an ongoing market abuse investigation and/or any other securities or 
commodities violations, if such dissemination is in the public interest.157 The Director of Financial Institutions may also 
impose administrative sanctions like injunctions, mandamus, cease and desist orders, restraining orders and restitution 
orders against any person who commits market abuse offences or violates any provision of the Securities Act of 
Washington.158  
The Director of Financial Institutions relies on the relevant courts to enforce its administrative sanctions or other 
court actions against the market abuse offenders and those who violate the relevant rules.159 The courts play a key role in 
judicial review hearings involving any person aggrieved by an order or decision of the Director of Financial Institutions.160 
Unlike Delaware161 and California,162 Washington statutorily empowers the Director of Financial Institutions to 
cooperate with other State and federal enforcement authorities in order to effectively combat fraud, market abuse and 
other related securities or commodities violations.163 Another advantage of Washington is the statutory availability of non-
exclusive common law penalties and private rights of action for the prejudiced persons to claim their damages directly 
from the market abuse offenders.164 This has enabled Washington to have some influence on corporate law making 
(including the development and enforcement market abuse laws) both at State and federal levels in the US.165 Likewise, 
the Financial Markets Act now directly empowers the FSB to cooperate with other local and international regulatory 
bodies in order to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.166 However, it remains to be 
seen whether this provision167 will be successfully employed to investigate and combat cross-border market abuse 
                                                                            
149 Conspicuously, unlike the position in South Africa, Washington does not have a specific regulatory body that enforces its market abuse prohibition. 
150 Paragraph 2.9 above. 
151 Notwithstanding the advantages of this broad and unrestricted insider trading enforcement approach, it is submitted that Washington should consider 
enacting an adequate provision that expressly define and prohibit the insider trading offence to enhance enforcement.  
152 S 21.20.110(1) read with (2) to (9); ss 21.20.120 & 21.20.130 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
153 See s 84 read with s 82 of the Financial Markets Act. In other words, the Financial Markets Act merely provides that the FSB may publish the outcome of 
its market abuse investigations on its website or any other appropriate media if such publication is in the public interest, see s 84(2)(e).  
154 Ss 21.20.370 & 21.20.700 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
155 Ss 21.20.380 & 21.20.700 of the Securities Act of Washington; also see ss 21.30.100 & 21.30.110 of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
156 Paragraph 2.8 above. 
157 S 21.20.370(1) & (2) of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.170 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
158 S 21.20.390 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
159 Ss 21.30.120 & 21.30.140 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
160 S 21.20.440 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.400 of the Commodity Transactions Act, which states that the Director of Financial Institutions 
has powers to make, amend or rescind any rules, forms and orders relating to commodities transactions.  
161 Paragraph 2.8 above. 
162 Paragraph 2.4 above. 
163 S 21.20.450 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.180 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
164 S 21.20.420 read with s 21.20.430 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.370 of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
165  Roe 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 638 5-9 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2013).  
166 See s 84(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Act.  
167 See s 84(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Act.  
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activities in South Africa and elsewhere. In addition, as earlier stated,168 the available penalties and/or available remedies 
for market abuse offences are still minimal and somewhat inconsistently169 enforced in South Africa. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The article has revealed that the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in the US mainly involves the 
relevant financial or corporation departments at the states level.170 Although this state prohibition on market abuse is not 
uniform,171 it has, to a great extent, relatively managed to consistently discourage market abuse practices in the US.  
On the other hand, the South African market abuse regime relies mainly on the FSB to police and enforce the 
market abuse ban. This approach has so far not been able to achieve more settlements and prosecutions in cases 
involving market abuse in South Africa.172 This could be evidenced in part, by many delays in investigations, settlements 
and the inherent paucity of successful criminal prosecutions obtained in market abuse cases in South Africa to date.173 
Moreover, deficiencies such as the inconsistent application of the market abuse provisions and the use of few 
enforcement measures have directly impeded the curbing of market abuse in South Africa.174 In light of these and other 
flaws indicated above, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact specific provisions for 
separate and distinct criminal penalties that can be imposed upon any juristic person or individual who commit or 
attempts to commit insider trading or market manipulation offences in South Africa (with higher criminal penalties being 
imposed on such juristic persons).  
It is also suggested that the Financial Markets Act should be amended to provide specific market abuse whistle-
blower immunity provisions and bounty rewards for the purposes of encouraging all the persons to report market abuse 
activities to the FSB and/or other relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa. Furthermore, the Financial Markets Act 
should be amended to statutorily and expressly empower the FSB to use public censure against the market abuse 
offenders in South Africa. Additionally, the Financial Markets Act should be amended to enact provisions that specifically 
prohibit insurance-related as well as Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa. 
Furthermore, as is the position in Delaware (where there is a system in place for periodic revisions of the Delaware 
Codes), the South African policy makers should consider appointing a National Market Abuse Commission to examine 
and review all the matters and laws pertaining to market abuse in South Africa. In conclusion, another option is for the 
South African policy makers to consider introducing provincial market abuse statutes to: (a) create regulatory competition 
among the provinces to attract investors by effectively combating market abuse activities (b) promote dual or concurrent 
regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban both at a provincial and national level. This should, however, be 
managed well to avoid creating potential problems such as balkanisation and/or violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois 
convict doctrine. 
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